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The aims of this study were to investigate choking susceptibility in a perceptual judgment task and to
examine the predictive validity of the Decision Speciﬁc Reinvestment Scale (DSRS). A computer-based,
choice response time basketball passing task was performed under low and high pressure conditions.
Complexity was manipulated by depicting 3-on-3 and 5-on-5 scenarios. Repeated-measures ANOVAs
revealed performance decrements under pressure with regard to response accuracy, moderated by task
complexity, and a general speeding of performance over successive blocks. The DSRS was a signiﬁcant
predictor of poorer response accuracy under pressure in the high-complex task. Examination of the DSRS
subscales revealed rumination as the only signiﬁcant factor, predicting changes in response time and
accuracy in the low- and high-complex versions of the task, respectively. Findings support the predictive
validity of the DSRS, and highlight the importance of avoiding ruminative thoughts when making
complex decisions under pressure.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
The competitive sporting environment is psychologically
demanding and it is not uncommon to see athletes performing
signiﬁcantly below expectations in spite of high motivation and
incentives for success; this is referred to as ‘choking’ (Jackson,
Beilock, & Kinrade, 2013). Researchers examining the factors un-
derlying this phenomenon have tended to focus on the attentional
processes governing skill execution (Baumeister, 1984; Masters,
Polman, & Hammond, 1993). The two main theoretical frame-
works that have been used to explain choking, distraction and
self-focus, draw evidence from differing backgrounds. Distraction
theories suggest that increases in performance pressure provoke a
shift in focus of attention to task-irrelevant cues, and draw support
from working memory intensive cognitive tasks (Beilock, Kulp,
Holt, & Carr, 2004). In contrast, self-focus theories suggest that
performance pressure increases self-awareness about performing
correctly causing individuals to try to consciously control normally
automatic processes and behaviors (Masters, 1992).e and Human Performance,
. Tel.: þ44 (0)1895 267383;
nrade).
Ltd. This is an open access article uMasters and colleagues' work on reinvestment addresses indi-
vidual differences in the tendency to reinvest, deﬁned as the
“propensity for manipulation of conscious, explicit, rule-based
knowledge, by working memory, to control the mechanics of
one's movements during motor output” (Masters&Maxwell, 2004,
p.208). The concept of reinvestment has received substantial sup-
port from a variety of motor tasks including golf putting (Hardy,
Mullen, & Jones, 1996), a football ‘wall volley’ task (Chell,
Graydon, Crowley, & Child, 2003) and ﬁeld-hockey dribbling
(Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006). With respect to individual
differences Masters et al. (1993) developed the Reinvestment Scale
(RS) and found that individuals classiﬁed as high reinvesters were
more likely to suffer skill failure under pressure than low rein-
vesters (e.g., Kinrade, Jackson& Ashford, 2010; Masters et al., 1993).
Following conceptual advancements in the deﬁnition of reinvest-
ment, and to address limitations in the design of the original scale,
Masters, Eves, and Maxwell (2005) developed the Movement-
Speciﬁc Reinvestment Scale (MSRS). Factor analysis of the scale
revealed two distinct factors: movement self-consciousness, which
concerns the ‘style’ of movement and public perceptions, and
consciousmotor processing, which focuses on the contemplation of
the process of movement. To date, there has been little research
into the psychometric properties of the MSRS in sport; however,
evidence from health settings indicates that an inward focus of
attention on performance processes may be disruptive. Fornder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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dence of falls in the elderly (Wong, Masters, Maxwell, & Abernethy,
2008), the length of time individuals have been suffering from
Parkinson's disease (Masters, Pall, MacMahon, & Eves, 2007), and
functional impairment in stroke patients (Orrell, Masters, & Eves,
2009). Concerning the association between movement-speciﬁc
reinvestment and performance under pressure, Malhotra,
Poolton, Wilson, Ngo, and Masters (2012) found that surgeons
who were low reinvesters performed signiﬁcantly faster and more
efﬁciently on a laparoscopic task than their high-reinvester coun-
terparts when under temporal pressure. Differences in the neural
co-activations of high and low reinvesters have also been observed;
Zhu, Poolton, Wilson, Maxwell, and Masters (2011) found that high
scorers on the MSRS showed signiﬁcantly greater cortical co-
activation between the verbal analytical and motor planning re-
gions of the cortex compared to low scorers. The greater coherence
between these regions reﬂects the increased role that verbal-
analytical processes play during motor performance in high
reinvesters.
Research examining the role of reinvestment in skill failure
under pressure has typically focused on motor tasks while re-
searchers have tended to appeal to distraction theory to explain
skill failure in cognitive tasks (Beilock et al., 2004). While these
offer the most plausible explanations for each task type, Beilock
et al., also noted that the type of skill being executed and/or the
ability of the performer may moderate the applicability of each
theory. There is also some evidence that reinvestment might apply
to skill failure in perceptual-motor tasks. Such tasks involve cog-
nitions required to make a decision accompanied by a motor
response (e.g. tennis serve return with cross court forehand).
Whilst the performer uses working memory to make a conscious
decision based on presented stimuli and experience, the motor
response, which through practice becomes automated, is per-
formed without online processing of working memory. Smeeton,
Williams, Hodges, and Ward (2005) found that junior players
who learned to judge the direction and depth of tennis strokes with
the aid of explicit rules subsequently suffered performance decre-
ments when performing under pressure. Indeed, explicit learners
became both slower and less accurate under pressure and slowing
of decision timewas strongly correlatedwith the number of explicit
rules reported. By contrast, this correlation was non-signiﬁcant in
the guided discovery and discovery learning groups. Similarly,
Poolton, Masters, and Maxwell (2006) and Masters, Poolton,
Maxwell, and Raab (2008) investigated the beneﬁts of implicit
learning to cognitive efﬁciency in a task involving both motor and
decision-making components. Following training, in which partic-
ipants learned to perform a table tennis shot either implicitly
(through analogy learning) or explicitly, motor performance and
movement kinematics were assessed as participants performed a
concurrent low- and high-complexity decision-making task con-
cerned with where to direct the shot. Findings from both studies
revealed that only explicit learners exhibited performance decre-
ments when performing a concurrent decision-making task and
this was conﬁned to the high-complex version of the task. They
concluded that explicit processes place an increased load upon
working memory, due to the conscious retrieval of declarative
knowledge to control motor skill execution, which impairs pro-
cessing efﬁciency and the ability to meet the demands of multiple
concurrent tasks.
Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford (2010) examined the moderating
effect of dispositional reinvestment upon choking in motor and
cognitive tasks of varying complexity. They found that pressure had
a deleterious effect on performance in a low complex motor task
(peg board), led to faster but more error-prone performance in a
high-complexity psychomotor task (card sorting), and led to moreerrors in a high-complexity working memory task (modular
arithmetic). High RS scores were signiﬁcantly correlated with per-
formance decrements from low to high pressure conditions in both
low and high complex (golf putting) motor tasks, and in both
working memory tasks. However, higher RS scores were associated
with a speeding of performance from the low to high pressure
condition in the psychomotor tasks.
Evidence that the association between reinvestment and
choking extends beyond the motor domain led Kinrade, Jackson,
Ashford and Bishop (2010) to develop the Decision-Speciﬁc Rein-
vestment Scale (DSRS); their intention being to measure the pro-
pensity for reinvesting explicit knowledge in decision-making
tasks. The scale comprises two factors, decision reinvestment and
decision rumination, and was developed by adapting items from
the original RS. Their initial investigation into the predictive val-
idity of the scale used judgments of coaches, who were required to
rate a player's tendency to choke on a 10-point Likert-type scale
anchored by 1 (“never chokes under pressure”) and 10 (“always
chokes under pressure”). Analysis revealed a strong correlation
between DSRS scores and peer ratings of decision failure under
stress (n ¼ 59, r ¼ .74, p < .01). In a ﬁeld-based study of passing
accuracy in netball players Jackson, Kinrade, Hicks, andWills (2013)
found that the DSRS, but not MSRS, was a signiﬁcant predictor of
change in passing accuracy from low-to high-pressure games.
Jackson et al. acknowledged that it was not possible to determine
the extent to which poorer passing performance related to the
decision making and skill execution components of the pass.
However, in a study of referees' decision making, Poolton, Siu, and
Masters (2011) found that soccer referees who scored highly on the
rumination factor of the DSRS, exhibited greater bias towards the
home team in the decisions they made.
Task complexity has been identiﬁed as a moderating factor in
the examination of performance under pressure. Within the liter-
ature, choking has been observed in relatively complexmotor tasks,
such as golf putting, basketball free throw, baseball batting, and
soccer and ﬁeld-hockey dribbling (e.g., Hill, Hanton, Matthews, &
Fleming, 2010; Jackson et al., 2006; Masters et al., 1993; Otten,
2009), training for which is typically associated with substantial
technical instruction. However, performance on simple motor tasks
has provedmore robust under stress. For example, Magill and Clark
(1997) and Masters et al. (1993) found no evidence of performance
breakdown on a simple tracking task and rod-tracing task,
respectively, while Baumeister, Hutton, and Cairns (1990) found
that performance on a simple card-sorting task actually improved
under pressure. Similarly, Beilock et al. (2004) found that pressure
impaired performance on modular arithmetic problems that place
high demands on working memory but not on less demanding
problems. Further, Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford (2010) only
observed choking in complex versions of cognitive based tasks
(working memory and psychomotor).
The aims of the present study were, ﬁrst, to investigate choking
susceptibility in a complex perceptual judgment task. In so doing,
the second aim was to examine the predictive validity of the DSRS
in a task in which complexity was systematically manipulated. A
choice response time basketball task was chosen that required
participants to judge to whom to pass the ball, with complexity
manipulated by depicting 3-on-3 and 5-on-5 versions of the task.
Based on previous research (e.g., Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford &
Bishop, 2010), we predicted that propensity for reinvestment
would be associated with poorer decision making under high
pressure relative to low pressure. The second aim of the study was
to determine whether the DSRS or the original RS is a better tool for
predicting performance decrements under pressure in a decision-
making task. To this end, we compared the predictive validity of
the two scales.
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Participants
Having gained institutional ethical approval 38 skilled male
basketball players (M Age ¼ 23.46 years, SD ¼ 4.90) were recruited
for the study. At the time of the study participants were competing
for local clubs (n ¼ 25), in county or regional level teams (n ¼ 2), or
at national league level (n ¼ 11) and had a mean of 10.00 years
(SD ¼ 4.65) competitive experience.Design and measures
A 2 (Task Complexity)  3 (Pressure) factorial design was used,
with the pressure factor incorporating an A-B-A design (low pres-
sure, high pressure, low pressure). Response time and response
accuracy served as dependent variables. Response time was
calculated as the mean response time across all trials, within each
block, at each level of complexity; whilst response accuracy was
calculated as the percentage of correct trials across all trials, within
each block, at each level of complexity.The reinvestment scale (RS)
The RS (Masters et al., 1993) comprises 20 items and has good
internal reliability (a ¼ .86) and test-retest reliability over a four-
month period (r ¼ .74). In line with previous studies, (Jackson
et al., 2006; Kinrade, Jackson, & Ashford, 2010), participants rated
each item on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 0 (extremely un-
characteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic).Decision-speciﬁc reinvestment scale (DSRS)
The DSRS (Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford, & Bishop, 2010) com-
prises 13 items that assess an individual's propensity to engage in
behaviors detrimental to performance under pressure. The ﬁrst
factor, decision reinvestment, assesses the conscious monitoring
of processes involved in making a decision; for example, “I'm
always trying to ﬁgure out how I make decisions”. The second
factor, decision rumination, assesses the tendency to focus
on past inaccurate decisions they have made; for example,
“I remember poor decisions I make for a long time afterwards”.
Participants rated each item on the same 5-point Likert-type scale
used for the RS. Acceptable internal consistency estimates have
been reported for both decision reinvestment (a ¼ .89) and de-
cision rumination (a ¼ 91) (Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford, & Bishop,
2010). Internal consistency scores for the current sample were
calculated and above acceptable for all scales (DSRS: decision
reinvestment a ¼ .80, decision rumination a ¼ .85; RS: Rein-
vestment a ¼ .83).Assessment of explicit knowledge
To measure participants' awareness of information governing
their decisions, participants were required to write down any
information they considered important in making their de-
cisions. Practice clips were shown to participants to aid recall and
enhance the sensitivity of the test. Explicit rules were opera-
tionally deﬁned as statements that referred to speciﬁc aspects of
the offense, individual player characteristics, or information
relating these features to a player's openness to receive a pass.
Statements were assessed by two independent raters who
counted the number of explicit rules reported for each partici-
pant. Participants were also required to rate the importance of
this information and their awareness of using it in each block of
trials.Manipulation checks
State anxiety
To assess the effectiveness of the pressure manipulation, the
cognitive and somatic anxiety subscales of the Revised Competitive
State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2R: Cox, Martens, & Russell, 2003)
were administered prior to the low- and high-pressure trials. Par-
ticipants rated anxiety intensity on a 4-point Likert-type scale
anchored by 1 (not at all) and 4 (very much so). Cox et al. (2003)
reported acceptable internal consistency estimates for both
cognitive (a > .81) and somatic anxiety subscales (a > .82).
Perceived pressure
After each condition participants were asked to rate how much
pressure they felt they were under on a 7-point Likert-type scale
anchored by 1 (“no pressure”) and 7 (“extreme pressure”) (Kinrade,
Jackson & Ashford, 2010).
Construction of test stimuli and experimental task
Two-choice and four-choice response time tasks were devel-
oped inwhich participants were required to judge to whom to pass
the ball (see Fig.1). The situation used in this experiment was based
on a simple ‘motion offence’ that involved players ‘screening’ away
from the ball to provide two passing options (low complex trials:
pass to the cutting forward; pass to the sealing guard) or four
passing options (high-complex trials: pass to the cutting forward;
pass to the cutting guard; pass to the sealing forward; pass to the
sealing guard). Scenarios were ﬁlmed using an HD tripod-mounted
video camera (Canon HV30) to provide a pool of eight to 10 trials for
every option. Players from a premier division University basketball
team were used as models for clip construction. Video trials were
edited using Pinnacle Studio (Version 11.0) to create the stimuli for
the practice and test blocks. Trials had a mean duration of 4750 ms
(SD ¼ 780) and a gray screen of 1700 ms duration followed the
occlusion of each clip. Participants were instructed that responses
must be made before the end of the gray screen or the response
would be recorded as incorrect. Video sequences of each scenario
were selected based on independent evaluations of two expert
national league coaches who rated each clip for quality, based on
how much the clip represented a good example of the offensive
arrangement, and clarity of the available passing option, using a ﬁve
point Likert-based scale. The top four trials for each option were
selected for use in the experiment and were randomly distributed
across the four blocks. Inter-rater reliability for quality ratings of
clips was assessed using intra-class correlations for high complex
(ICC ¼ .74) and low complex trials (ICC ¼ .79). Finally, by viewing
the video frame-by-frame, the coaches calculated a ‘decision point’
for each video sequence, operationally deﬁned as the point at
which the best passing option became evident. This was used as a
reference to determine participant decision time for each trial.
Inter-rater reliability between the two coaches for decision point
was found to be very high (high complex trials: ICC ¼ .99; low
complex trials: ICC ¼ .99).
To familiarize participants with the task, the time constraints for
responding, and the offensive arrangement used in the test stimuli
participants were presented with 36 trials. Familiarization trials
consisted of three clips of each of the four passing option for the
high-complexity (3  4 ¼ 12 unique clips) and low-complexity
(3  2 ¼ 6 unique clips) sequences repeated for two cycles (total of
36 trials). The test blocks consisted of one cycle of unique clips used
(total of 18 trials). The test phase consisted of 54 trials divided equally
amongst the three experimental blocks (low pressure 1 (LP1), high
pressure, low pressure 2 (LP2)). Each block consisted of novel clips
and the passing options and complexity were randomized.
Fig. 1. Video stills depicting the design of the video stimuli used for the low-complex, two-choice response time (upper panel) and high-complex, four-choice response time (lower
panel) tasks.
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Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, US). Video sequences
were presented on a computer screen viewed from a distance of
approximately 0.5 m. Participants responded to each sequence by
pressing one of two (low-complex trials) or four (high-complex
trials) buttons positioned horizontally on a handheld response pad
corresponding with players' on-court position (see Fig. 1).Pressure manipulation
The pressure manipulation involved two steps; the ﬁrst induced
evaluation apprehension by requiring participants to perform the
task in the presence of an associate of the experimenter who ﬁlmed
the trials. A cover story was given in which participants were told
their performance was to be ﬁlmed for the Basketball National
Governing Body in order to assess their anticipation and decision
making skills against other players of their level and ability. In
addition, participants were told that if they could improve their
performance score by 20% relative to the average for their age and
ability, they would receive £10 and that the best performer in the
study would win £100.Procedure
Having gained informed consent, the initial questionnaire
package comprising the DSRS, RS and demographic questionnairewas administered. Participants were informed about the nature
of the task and that they should respond as quickly and accu-
rately as possible as both decision time and judgment accuracy
would be used to determine overall performance. This instruc-
tion was reinforced prior to each block of trials. Participants were
then shown the familiarization trials. Immediately prior to each
block of test trials, the CSAI-2R was administered, whilst ratings
of perceived pressure were recorded immediately after each
block. The 18 trials constituting LP1 were then presented.
Following this test block, participants were introduced to the
experimenter's associate and were given the cover story
regarding ﬁlming and details of the performance needed in order
to win the prize money. Following the high-pressure block of
trials the associate departed and participants were informed that
the ﬁnal block of trials (LP2) would not be ﬁlmed and that their
performance would not affect any prize they may have won.
Following the completion of all test trials, participants completed
the explicit knowledge test before being debriefed and thanked
for their participation.Data analysis
To analyze the effect of pressure on performance, response
time and accuracy data were subjected to separate 2 3 (Task
complexity Pressure) repeated measures ANOVAs. Predictive
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regression analyses using global scores of each scale as predictors
of performance change between high and low pressure blocks
(mean low pressure block score minus high pressure block score)
for response time and accuracy data. Further, to assess the indi-
vidual contribution of each DSRS factor, separate multiple
regression analyses were performed. Finally, Pearson's product
moment correlation coefﬁcients were calculated to assess the
relationships between the DSRS, its related subscales, the RS, and
the number of explicit rules reported. The number of explicit
rules reported was also correlated with change in performance
between high and low-pressure blocks. Alpha was set to .05 for all
tests.Results
Preliminary screening of all data, using univariate z scores
(>±3.29) and Mahalanobis distance values, revealed no outliers.
Descriptive statistics revealed participants' DSRS scores ranged
from 11 to 48 (M ¼ 30.00, SD ¼ 9.11) and RS scores ranged from 19
to 64 (M ¼ 41.71, SD ¼ 10.68).Fig. 2. Mean (±SE) response accuracy scores (upper panel) and response times (lower
panel) on the low-complexity and high-complexity decision-making tasks under low-
and high-pressure conditions.Response accuracy
A 2 3 (Task complexity Pressure) repeated measures ANOVA
revealed signiﬁcant main effects for task complexity,
F(1,37) ¼ 30.36, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .45, and pressure, F(2,36) ¼ 7.05,
p ¼ .003, hp2 ¼ .28. Further, a signiﬁcant interaction was found
between task complexity and pressure F(2,36) ¼ 7.05, p ¼ .003,
hp
2 ¼ .28. To examine the interaction, separate one-way repeated
measures ANOVAswere performed for each level of complexity. For
the low-complex trials the analysis revealed a signiﬁcant effect of
pressure, F(2,36) ¼ 4.57, p ¼ .017, hp2 ¼ .20 with pairwise compari-
sons showing a signiﬁcant difference between LP1 (M ¼ .84,
SE ¼ .04) and LP2 (M ¼ .93, SE ¼ .03, p ¼ .017) indicating a slight
improvement between the ﬁrst and last low pressure blocks. For
the high-complex trials, a signiﬁcant effect of pressure,
F(2,36) ¼ 4.07, p ¼ .026, hp2 ¼ .18, was also observed. Pairwise
comparisons revealed a signiﬁcant difference between high pres-
sure (M¼ .68, SE¼ .03) and both LP1 (M¼ .76, SE¼ .02, p¼ .03) and
LP2 (M¼ .77, SE¼ .02, p¼ .02) reﬂecting poorer performance in the
high pressure condition (see Fig. 2).Response time
A 2 3 (Task complexity Pressure) repeated measures
ANOVA revealed signiﬁcant main effects for task complexity, F(1,
37) ¼ 26.60, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .42, and pressure, F(2, 36) ¼ 53.79, p < .
001, hp2 ¼ .75. Further, a signiﬁcant interaction was observed be-
tween task complexity and pressure, F(2, 36) ¼ 13.23, p < .001,
hp
2 ¼ .42. To follow up the interaction, the effect of pressure was
assessed at each level of complexity. The analysis revealed a
signiﬁcant effect of pressure in the low-complex trials, F(2,
36) ¼ 44.49, p < . 001, hp2 ¼ .71, with performance in LP1
(M ¼ 76.22, SE ¼ 28.81) signiﬁcantly slower than in high pressure
(M ¼ 104.43, SE ¼ 24.59, p < .001) and LP2 (M ¼ 105.22,
SE ¼ 23.28, p < .001). There was also a signiﬁcant effect of pres-
sure in the high-complex trials, F(2, 36)¼ 28.66, p < . 001, hp2¼ .61,
with performance in LP2 (M ¼ 58.56, SE ¼ 30.30) signiﬁcantly
faster than in LP1 (M ¼ 127.26, SE ¼ 32.88, p < .001) and high
pressure (M ¼ 71.37, SE ¼ 31.63, p < .001). Overall, these results
reﬂect a slight quickening of response times across the test (see
Fig. 2).Predictive validity of the reinvestment and decision-speciﬁc
reinvestment scales
To compare the predictive validity of the DSRS to the original RS,
separate standard multiple regressions were conducted for the
low- and high-complex trials (see Table 1), using the difference in
response accuracy and response time between low- and high-
pressure conditions as the dependent variables. Pearson product
moment correlation coefﬁcients were also calculated to assess the
relationship between predictors. Analysis of the low-complex trials
revealed neither scale to be a signiﬁcant predictor of response ac-
curacy or response time change under pressure. In the high-
complex trials, DSRS score was found to be a signiﬁcant predictor
of decrements in response accuracy under pressure but not deci-
sion time, whilst RS score was a non-signiﬁcant predictor of both
variables. Correlation analysis also revealed RS score to be unre-
lated to DSRS global and subscale scores (see Table 3).
To examine the predictive validity of the DSRS subscales, sepa-
rate multiple regression analyses were conducted for decision
reinvestment and decision rumination in the low- and high-
complex trials. Results revealed that decision reinvestment was
not a signiﬁcant predictor of difference in decision accuracy or time,
whilst decision rumination was predictive of pressure differences
in response time and accuracy in the low and high complex ver-
sions of the task respectively (Table 2).
Table 1
Multiple Regression Analysis examining the inﬂuence of Decision-Speciﬁc Rein-
vestment Scale scores and original Reinvestment Scale scores on performance
change under pressure in low- and high-complexity tasks.
B SE B b
Low-Complex
Response Accuracy
Constant .038 .093
Decision-Speciﬁc Reinvestment Scale .002 .002 .127
Original Reinvestment Scale .000 .002 .030
Response Time
Constant 43.855 87.425
Decision-Speciﬁc Reinvestment Scale 3.753 2.125 .295
Original Reinvestment Scale 1.595 1.814 .147
High-Complex
Response Accuracy
Constant .160 .121
Decision-Speciﬁc Reinvestment Scale .009 .003 .466**
Original Reinvestment Scale .001 .003 .036
Response Time
Constant 16.392 86.080
Decision-Speciﬁc Reinvestment Scale 2.435 2.092 .194
Original Reinvestment Scale 3.032 1.786 .283
Note: Low-Complex: Response Accuracy, R2 ¼ .02, DR2 ¼ .04, Response Time,
R2 ¼ .09, DR2 ¼ .03; High-Complex: Response Accuracy, R2 ¼ .21, DR2 ¼ .17;
Response Time, R2 ¼ .09, DR2 ¼ .04. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Table 2
Multiple regression analysis examining the inﬂuence of Decision-Speciﬁc Rein-
vestment Scale subscales scores on performance change under pressure in low- and
high-complexity tasks.
B SE B b
Low-Complex
Response Accuracy
Constant .040 .070
Decision Reinvestment .001 .005 .035
Decision Rumination .003 .004 .164
Response Time
Constant 13.478 65.147
Decision Reinvestment 2.669 4.709 .102
Decision Rumination 7.049 3.376 .375*
High-Complex
Response Accuracy
Constant .148 .087
Decision Reinvestment .003 .006 .065
Decision Rumination .016 .005 .563**
Response Time
Constant 69.435 67.176
Decision Reinvestment 2.091 4.856 .081
Decision Rumination 3.816 3.481 .206
Note: Low-Complex: Response Accuracy, R2 ¼ .02, DR2 ¼ .03, Response Time,
R2 ¼ .12, DR2 ¼ .07; High-Complex: Response Accuracy, R2 ¼ .29, DR2 ¼ .25;
Response Time, R2 ¼ .03 DR2 ¼ .02. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Table 3
Pearsons product moment correlations between RS, DSRS global and subscale scores,
complexity tasks.
DSRS
reinvestment
DSRS
rumination
DSRS
global
RS
DSRS Rumination .467**
DSRS Global .801** .903**
RS .163 .264 .258
Low Complex Accuracy Difference .041 .147 .120 .003
Low Complex RT Difference .073 .328* .257 .071
High Complex Accuracy Difference .198 .533** .457** .084
High Complex RT Difference .015 .168 .121 .233
Explicit_Rules .034 .112 .092 .096
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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that high scores on the global DSRS and the decision rumination
subscale were associated with greater performance decrements
under pressure in the high-complex trials only. In low-complex
trials, high scores on the decision rumination sub-scale were
associated with faster decision-making under pressure.Explicit knowledge
Information reported as underpinning participants' choices,
focused either on offensive awareness (e.g., readiness of receiver,
size mis-matches, speed of cutter, strength/speed of screener),
defensive awareness (e.g., location of defender, defensive strategy
for dealing with screens, position of supporting defenders), and/or
threats to outcome (e.g., ease of pass, type of pass, ease of shot from
pass, distance of pass to basket). One-tailed Pearson pro-
ductemoment correlation coefﬁcients were calculated between
the number of explicit rules reported and the change in perfor-
mance between high- and mean low-pressure blocks. Analyses
revealed no signiﬁcant relationships for decision accuracy or deci-
sion time in either the low-complex (response accuracy, r ¼ .04,
p¼ .41; response time, r¼.23, p¼ .08) or high-complex (response
accuracy, r ¼ .24, p ¼ .07; response time, r ¼ .17, p ¼ .15) condi-
tions. The number of explicit rules reported was also unrelated to
RS scores (r ¼ .10, p ¼ .57), DSRS global (r ¼ .09, p ¼ .58) and sub-
scale scores (Decision Reinvestment, r ¼ .03, p ¼ .84, Decision
Rumination, r ¼ .11, p ¼ .50).Pressure manipulation checks
To test whether the pressuremanipulationwas successful a one-
way repeated measures MANOVA was performed on the cognitive
and somatic CSAI-2R subscale scores and perceived pressure rat-
ings. The multivariate analysis revealed a signiﬁcant effect of
pressure, Wilks' Lambda ¼ .22, F(6,32) ¼ 18.46, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .78.
After applying Greenhouse-Geisser corrections univariate analyses
revealed signiﬁcant effects of pressure for cognitive anxiety,
F(1.69,62.47) ¼ 22.85, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .38, somatic anxiety,
F(1.49,55.25) ¼ 13.09, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .26, and perceived pressure
ratings, F(1.53,56.57) ¼ 64.07, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .63. Pairwise compar-
isons revealed signiﬁcantly higher (p < .01) cognitive anxiety, so-
matic anxiety, and perceived pressure in the high-pressure block
than in the low-pressure blocks (cognitive anxiety: LP1, M ¼ 16.47,
SE ¼ .75; High Pressure, M ¼ 20.63, SE ¼ 1.17; LP2, M ¼ 14.53,
SE ¼ .80; somatic anxiety: LP1, M ¼ 12.71, SE ¼ .47; High Pressure,
M ¼ 15.60, SE ¼ .87; LP2, M ¼ 12.70, SE ¼ .55; perceived pressure:
LP1, M ¼ 2.45, SE ¼ .19; High Pressure, M ¼ 4.50, SE ¼ .24; LP2,
M¼ 2.02, SE¼ .24). Additionally, cognitive anxiety was signiﬁcantly
lower in LP2 than LP1 (p ¼ .03).and performance change performance change under pressure in low- and high-
Low complex
Accuracy difference
Low complex RT
difference
High complex
Accuracy difference
High complex
RT difference
.350*
.356* .376*
.012 .092 .360*
.036 .230 .241 .173
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The purpose of the present study was to investigate the effect of
pressure on performance on a low- and high-complex version of a
time-constrained decision-making task, and to examine the pre-
dictive validity of the DSRS (Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford, & Bishop,
2010). In the study, participants were required to respond to
video stimuli depicting a common offensive set in basketball, that
required either a two-choice (low-complex) or four-choice (high-
complex) response. Participants responded as quickly and accu-
rately as possible by indicating which player was the best option to
pass to. The cognitive and somatic anxiety sub-scales of the CSAI-2R
and the ratings of perceived pressure were used to examine the
success of the pressure manipulation. Overall, the analysis revealed
performance decrements under pressure with regard to response
accuracy, which was moderated by task complexity. Whilst the
analysis of the response time datawas less clear, a general speeding
of performance over successive blocks was observed, with either
blocks two and/or three being faster depending on complexity.
There was also clear evidence that participants were more anxious
and felt under greater pressure during the high pressure trials than
in the low pressure trials. Examination of the predictive validity of
DSRS and RS revealed that only the DSRSwas a signiﬁcant predictor
of performance change under pressure with regard to response
accuracy in the high-complexity condition. With regard to the
subscales of the DSRS, analyses revealed that rumination was the
only signiﬁcant factor predicting changes in response time and
accuracy in the low and high complex versions of the task
respectively. Use of explicit knowledgewas found to be unrelated to
performance change under pressure and unrelated to ratings on
either the DSRS or RS.
In line with previous work examining choking in the motor skill
domain (see Masters & Maxwell, 2008), signiﬁcant decrements in
decision accuracy from low pressure to high pressure were only
observed in the more complex task. Whilst a signiﬁcant difference
in response time was observed in the low-complexity task, the
ﬁnding reﬂected a learning effect evidenced by observed differ-
ences between the two low-pressure blocks. The ﬁndings from the
regression analysis revealed DSRS global scores to be associated
with performance breakdown in response accuracy for the high-
complexity task. This extends the ﬁndings from the initial valida-
tion of the DSRS, wherein global scale scores were highly correlated
with peer ratings of choking tendency (Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford &
Bishop, 2010). This was only observed in the high-complexity
condition, mirroring the ﬁndings of Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford
(2010) and Masters et al. (1993) who found performance decre-
ments in only high-complex versions of their experimental tasks.
The inference drawn from such studies is that simple tasks place
relatively little burden on the processing capacity of participants,
meaning they are still able to meet the processing demands of the
task in spite of additional demands by they from concurrent
application of conscious control or competing ruminative thoughts.
Whilst there is evidence of an association between explicit
knowledge and propensity for reinvestment in the motor learning
literature (Poolton et al., 2006), there was no difference in the
amount of explicit knowledge reported by high and low reinvesters
in the present study, nor was it correlated with performance
change under pressure. There are several potential explanations for
these ﬁndings including ﬂoor or ceiling effects, lack of sensitivity of
themeasure or that performance failure in decision-making tasks is
not inﬂuenced by conscious control using explicit knowledge.
Given the dynamic interactive nature of the scenarios, ﬂoor and
ceiling effects seem unlikely. However, it is possible that the self-
report method of response may lack sensitivity, either in terms of
the number of rules reported or in reﬂecting the extent to whichthe rules were used. These ﬁndings also leave open the possibility
raised by Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford (2010) that the process of
explicit monitoring and conscious control is more inﬂuential to
performance breakdown than the number of explicit rules used, or
indeed that a different process of skill breakdown is implicated. An
alternative explanation may lie in the role of working memory.
Distraction-based accounts view choking as a result of reduced
working memory due to consumption from task-irrelevant cues
and thoughts of worry (Beilock et al., 2004). Masters and Maxwell
(2004) drew parity between reinvestment and distraction expla-
nations highlighting that the explicit processes used when rein-
vesting ones actions rely on working memory to store and
manipulate information and that a reduction in working memory
capacity to perform the primary task can result in performance
breakdown. Support for a working memory explanation was also
found in the studies of Poolton et al. (2006) and Masters et al.
(2008) on concurrent motor and decision making performance of
implicit and explicit learners. The experimental task used in the
current paper did not require a complexmotor response. Given that
support for distraction based accounts of choking has largely come
from cognitive based tasks (e.g. Beilock et al., 2004), it could be
argued that in such tasks, the role of distracting thoughts is more
inﬂuential to performance breakdown than conscious control and
may explain why the RS was unrelated to performance failure un-
der pressure. Potential support for this explanation is evident when
examining the regression analysis using the subscale factors of the
DSRS.
Results of the multiple regression analyses indicated that in
more complex decisions, the DSRS was a better predictor of less
accurate decision making under pressure than the original RS. The
DSRS was developed from the original RS; however, there are dif-
ferences in the factor structures of each instrument. A single rein-
vestment factor constituted the original scale and it did not attempt
to measure the process of reinvestment directly, but rather linked
conceptually-related items that aimed to predict this process. The
DSRS arguably has greater face validity, comprising two factors
hypothesized to consume working memory: ruminative thoughts
(decision rumination) and processing of explicit information during
the decision-making process (decision reinvestment). Perhaps the
DSRS's factor structure is more sensitive in examining of processes
that inhibit working memory, and subsequently impair perfor-
mance, than the original RS. Alternatively, the different factor
structure of the DSRS may reﬂect differences in the constructs each
scale measures. The non-signiﬁcant correlations between the
original RS and the DSRS global and sub-scale scores certainly
support this.
It could be argued that the rumination factor may assess a
predisposition to engage in distracting behaviors, potentially of-
fering support to distraction based accounts of choking such as
Attentional Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, &
Calvo, 2007). This theory suggests anxiety inﬂuences the balance
of two attentional systems: a top-down goal-directed system and a
bottom-up stimulus-driven system directs attention, by focusing
attention to the source of the threat. Under pressure, the inﬂuence
of the bottom-up system is increased, reducing the inhibition of
task-irrelevant information. Compensatory effort can mitigate
performance impairment, but will fail when resources are insufﬁ-
cient for the demands of the task. Thus offering further explanation
as to why performance decrements were not observed in the low-
complex versions of the tasks. ACT speciﬁcally highlights that the
emotional signiﬁcance of the threat is important, as it has a biasing
effect on attentional control. It is possible the rumination factor
highlights individuals who are more prone to worry about salient
threats prior to and during performance of a decision-making task,
which ultimately results in decrements to their performance.
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the rumination factor signiﬁcantly predicted poorer decision mak-
ing accuracy under pressure in the high-complex trials and faster
completion times under pressure in the low-complex trials. This
observation that rumination, and not conscious control of decision
processes, is the contributing factor in performance breakdown
under pressure on a high-complex decision making task lends
support to distraction based accounts such as ACT or Beilock et al.'s
(2004) working memory based explanation of choking.
The results also indicate that ruminative thoughts aided per-
formance in low-complex trials (evidenced by faster decisions
without compromising accuracy) but were disruptive to perfor-
mance in high-complex trials (evidenced by poorer accuracy with
no change to response time). Although speculative at this stage, one
possible explanation for this ﬁnding may lie in the concept of
perceived control, deﬁned as “the perception of one's capacity to be
able to cope and attain goals under stress” (Cheng, Hardy, &
Marklund, 2009, p. 273). Otten (2009) proposed perceived control
to be a key determinant of skill failure under pressure. He hy-
pothesized that if an athlete perceives control over a task, they will
engage less in conscious control, and be more likely to succeed
under pressure. It is conceivable that in low-complex decisions
perceived control remains high so ruminative thoughts are
perceived positively, for example serving tomotivate the performer
to rectify past mistakes. Conversely, duringmore complex decisions
perceived control is likely to be lower so ruminative thoughts may
be perceived negatively, reﬂected in individuals worrying about
repeating past mistakes. An individual's inability to dispel negative
cognitions and memories fueled by lack of perceived control, may
lead to difﬁculties attending to and processing new information
vital for performing a complex decision-making task (Joormann &
Gotlib, 2008). The interaction between rumination, increased de-
mands on working memory load and perceived control may be
addressed in future research by employing think-aloud protocols
and measures of perceived control to examine the nature and
magnitude of ruminative thoughts in low- and high-complex tasks.
The general trend in the response time data seemed to be a
speeding of decision time between blocks one and two and/or be-
tween blocks two and three that wasmoderated by task complexity.
This suggests that a speed-accuracy trade-off, often observed in
sporting domains, does not explain the performance decrements
under pressure in decision accuracy. A potential explanation for the
observed differences in decision accuracy under pressure in the
absence of changes in decision time may come from decision ﬁeld
theory (Busemeyer& Townsend,1993). The theory holds that, under
time pressure, decision makers may be subject to a decision
threshold (the point at which a decision must be made), leading
them to reduce the amount of information used in making a deci-
sion (Johnson, 2006). Participants were all required to complete the
task as quickly and as accurately as possible in order to achieve a
best performance score. Faster decision times result in less time
available to sample the relevant information upon which to base a
decision. As a result less salient information is often missed. As
reinvestment was not predictive of change in decision time under
pressure it may be assumed that the slower processing efﬁciency of
high reinvesters, as a result of conscious control strategies and
ruminative thoughts, reduced the amount of information they were
able to process before reaching the decision threshold, resulting in a
poorer decision than that of low reinvesters who were able to draw
from a more complete sample of processed information.
It is difﬁcult to draw clear conclusions regarding the implica-
tions of the present ﬁndings for performers or practitioners. On the
one hand, in the low-complex trials the extent of performance
decrements under high-pressure was relatively small and to some
degree masked by slight improvements in performance across thetest conditions. In the high-complex trials, where a clearer decre-
ment in performance was observed, the DSRS was a signiﬁcant
predictor of change in performance; however, analysis of the sub-
scales revealed only decision rumination to be signiﬁcant.
Accordingly, these data suggest that interventions directed towards
minimizing decision reinvestment, that is, the conscious moni-
toring of decision processes, will be ineffective. Conversely, in-
terventions that attempt to prevent or address ruminative thoughts
of past poor decisions are likely to be more effective in maintaining
decision making under pressure. Such interventions could focus on
cognitive interventions such as thought stopping (Zinsser, Bunker,
& Williams, 2001), positive self-talk (Hardy, Gammage, & Hall,
2001) and cognitive restructuring (Greenspan & Feltz, 1989).
Therewere several limitations that need to be acknowledged. The
ﬁrst is regarding the ecological validity of the task. In creating a video
based task, with a keypad response, the task simpliﬁed in terms of
cognitive demands of the stimuli and response compared to what
would normally be experienced. In an actual game, the player may
have to concurrently perform a complex motor task (dribbling)
whilst cognitively adapting to an evolving situation, with additional
stimuli and external threats (e.g. on ball defender), before
responding with a complex motor skill (performing the required
pass). Given the role that task complexity appears to play in skill
failure under pressure, it is possible that our ﬁndings in the low
complex task may not be representative of what happens in real
game situations. Additionally, the study design did not account for
discriminative validity between the DSRS and the original RS. The
data suggests that theRS andDSRSmayexaminedifferent constructs
as there was no signiﬁcant relationship between the two scales (and
between RS and subscale scores) and, whilst non-signiﬁcant, the RS
correlated negatively with performance change, while DSRS corre-
lates positively. The latter ﬁnding is particularly interesting given
that Kinrade, Jackson and Ashford (2010), Kinrade, Jackson, Ashford
and Bishop (2010) found RS scores to be associatedwithmore errors
on aworkingmemory dependent task, however this may be a result
of a lack of face validity as they used a generic assessment ofworking
memory (modular arithmetic). Notwithstanding, these ﬁndings
have identiﬁed a need to further examine the construct validity of
the DSRS. The prevalence of a factor that seems to be concernedwith
distraction based accounts of choking such as ACT, and a factor
concerned with conscious control indicates the inclusion of the two
main theories of choking within this psychometric instrument.
Additionally, future research should also look to include think aloud
protocols in order to establish if there are any changes in the
adoption of goal-directed and stimulus-driven attentional systems.
As a ﬁnal point, it is important to note there has been some
debate over the deﬁnition of ‘choking’; speciﬁcally, Mesagno and
Hill (2013) pointed to the dramatic instances of skill failure typi-
cally discussed in the media that involved more signiﬁcant declines
in performance than are generally observed in experimental
research on choking. They argued that the term ‘choking’ should be
reserved for these more signiﬁcant declines in performance, pro-
posing that a distinction be made between ‘choking’ and ‘under-
performance’ which was supported by athletes suggesting a
distinction in the perceived outcome and causes between the two
cases (Hill & Shaw, 2013). In response, Jackson (2013) argued that
the important question of whether there are common causes of
‘moderate’ and ‘major’ under-performance ﬁrst requires that
different levels of performance decrements are operationally
deﬁned. He noted Mesagno and Hill's reluctance to do this in their
proposed re-deﬁnition of choking, arguing that this effectively
rendered the hypothesis untestable. Further, Jackson noted that
Mesagno and Hill, and Hill, Hanton, Fleming and Matthews (2009),
conﬂated their deﬁnitions of the phenomenon with its putative
causes. Notwithstanding these conceptual issues, the extent to
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are governed by the same processes underlying larger decrements
in performance remains an important empirical question.
In conclusion, the results of the present study support the orig-
inal hypothesis that decision accuracy would be maintained across
all pressure conditions in the low complex task, whilst performance
decrements would be observed in the high pressure trials during the
high-complex task. The DSRS was found to be a signiﬁcant predictor
of choking, whilst the amount of explicit knowledge individuals
reported was unrelated to choking. More speciﬁcally, it was the
Rumination factor of the DSRS that was the key determinant of
performance decrements under pressure. Thus potentially offering
support for distraction based accounts of choking such as ACT.
Further, these ﬁndings suggest the DSRS has sound predictive val-
idity in identifying individuals whomay bemore prone to disrupted
decision making under pressure, and thus may provide coaches and
practitioners with a useful tool for identifying personal develop-
ment needs. The potential of the scale to be useful in other high
pressure decision making contexts and domains, such as medicine,
aviation and the military, has yet to be established.
References
Baumeister, R. F. (1984). Choking under pressure: self-consciousness and para-
doxical effects of incentives on skillful performance. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 46, 610e620.
Baumeister, R. F., Hutton, D. G., & Cairns, K. J. (1990). Negative effects of praise on
skilled performance. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 11, 131e148.
Beilock, S. L., Kulp, C. A., Holt, L. E., & Carr, T. H. (2004). More on the fragility of
performance: choking under pressure in mathematical problem solving. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 584e600.
Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (1993). Decision Field Theory: a dynamic
cognition approach to decision making. Psychological Review, 100, 432e459.
Chell, B. J., Graydon, J. K., Crowley, P. L., & Child, M. (2003). Manipulated stress and
dispositional reinvestment in a wall-volley task: an investigation into
controlled processing. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 97, 435e448.
Cheng, K. W., Hardy, L., & Marklund, D. (2009). Toward a three-dimesional con-
ceptualizatin of performance anxiety: rationale and initial measurement
development. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 10, 271e278.
Cox, R. H., Martens, M. P., & Russell, W. D. (2003). Measuring anxiety in athletics: the
revised competitive state anxiety Inventory-2. Journal of Sport and Exercise
Psychology, 25, 519e533.
Eysenck, M. W., Derakshan, N., Santos, R., & Calvo, M. G. (2007). Anxiety and
cognitive performance: attentional control theory. Emotion, 7(2), 336e353.
Greenspan, M. J., & Feltz, D. L. (1989). Psychological interventions with athletes in
competitive situations: a review. The Sport Psychologist, 3(3), 219e236.
Hardy, J., Gammage, K., & Hall, C. (2001). A descriptive study of athlete self-talk.
Sport Psychologist, 15(3), 306e318.
Hardy, L., Mullen, R., & Jones, G. (1996). Knowledge and conscious control of motor
actions under stress. British Journal of Psychology, 87, 621e636.
Hill, D. M., Hanton, S., Fleming, S., & Matthews, N. (2009). A re-examination of
choking in sport. European Journal of Sport Science, 9(4), 203e212.
Hill, D., Hanton, S., Matthews, N., & Fleming, S. (2010). A qualitative exploration of
choking in elite golf. Journal of Clinical Sport Psychology, 4, 221e240.
Hill, D. M., & Shaw, G. (2013). A qualitative examination of choking under pressure
in team sport. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 14(1), 103e110.
Jackson, R. C. (2013). Babies and bathwater: Commentary on Mesagno and Hill's
proposed re-deﬁnition of ‘choking’.
Jackson, R. C., Ashford, K. J., & Norsworthy, G. (2006). Attentional focus, dispositional
reinvestment and skilled motor performance under pressure. Journal of Sport
and Exercise Psychology, 28, 49e68.
Jackson, R. C., Beilock, S. L., & Kinrade, N. P. (2013). “Choking” in sport: research
and implications. In D. Farrow, J. Baker, & C. MacMahon (Eds.), Developingsport expertise: Researchers and coaches put theory into practice (2nd ed.).
(pp. 177e194). London: Routledge.
Jackson, R. C., Kinrade, N. P., Hicks, T., & Wills, R. (2013). Individual propensity for
reinvestment: ﬁeld-based evidence for the predictive validity of three scales.
International Journal of Sport Psychology, 44, 331e350.
Johnson, J. G. (2006). Cognitive modeling of decision making in sports. Psychology of
Sport & Exercise, 7, 631e652.
Joormann, J., & Gotlib, I. H. (2008). Updating the contents of working memory in
depression: interference from irrelevant negative material. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 117, 206e213.
Kinrade, N., Jackson, R. C., & Ashford, K. J. (2010). Dispositional reinvestment and
skill failure cognitive and motor tasks. Psychology of Sport & Exercise, 11,
312e319.
Kinrade, N., Jackson, R. C., Ashford, K. J., & Bishop, D. T. (2010). Development and
validation of the decision-speciﬁc reinvestment scale. Journal of Sports Sciences,
28, 1127e1135.
Magill, R. A., & Clark, R. (1997). Implicit vs. explicit learning of pursuit tracking
patterns. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 19. S85eS85.
Malhotra, N., Poolton, J. M., Wilson, M. R., Ngo, K., & Masters, R. S. W. (2012).
Conscious monitoring and control (reinvestment) in surgical performance un-
der pressure. Surgical Endoscopy, 26, 2423e2429.
Masters, R. S. W. (1992). Knowledge, knerves and know-how: the role of explicit
versus implicit knowledge in the breakdown of a complex motor skill under
pressure. British Journal of Psychology, 83, 343e358.
Masters, R. S. W., Eves, F. F., & Maxwell, J. P. (2005). Development of a movement
speciﬁc Reinvestment Scale. In T. Morris, P. Terry, S. Gordon, S. Hanrahan,
L. Ievleva, G. Kolt, et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the ISSP 11th World Congress of
Sport Psychology, Sydney, Australia.
Masters, R. S. W., & Maxwell, J. P. (2004). Implicit motor learning, reinvestment and
movement disruption: what you don't know won't hurt you? In A. M. Williams,
& N. J. Hodges (Eds.), Skill acquisition in sport: Research, theory and practice (pp.
207e228) London: Routledge.
Masters, R. S. W., & Maxwell, J. P. (2008). The theory of reinvestment. International
Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 1, 160e183.
Masters, R. S. W., Pall, H. S., MacMahon, K. M. A., & Eves, F. F. (2007). Duration of
Parkinson disease is associated with an increased propensity for ‘reinvestment’.
Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair, 21, 123e126.
Masters, R. S. W., Polman, R. C. J., & Hammond, N. V. (1993). ‘Reinvestment’: a
dimension of personality implicated in skill breakdown under pressure. Per-
sonality and Individual Differences, 14, 655e666.
Masters, R. S. W., Poolton, J. M., Maxwell, J. P., & Raab, M. (2008). Implicit motor
learning and complex decision making in time constrained environments.
Journal of Motor Behavior, 40, 71e79.
Mesagno, C., & Hill, D. M. (2013). Deﬁnition of choking in sport: re-conceptualiza-
tion and debate. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 44, 267e277.
Orrell, A., Masters, R. S. W., & Eves, F. F. (2009). Reinvestment and movement
disruption following stroke. Neurorehabilitation and Neural Repair, 23,
177e183.
Otten, M. (2009). Choking vs. clutch performance: a study of sport performance
under pressure. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 31, 583e601.
Poolton, J. M., Masters, R. S. W., & Maxwell, J. P. (2006). The inﬂuence of analogy
learning on decision making in table tennis: evidence from behavioural data.
Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 7, 677e688.
Poolton, J., Siu, C. M., & Masters, R. (2011). The home team advantage gives football
referees something to ruminate about. International Journal of Sports Science and
Coaching, 6(4), 545e552.
Smeeton, N. J., Williams, A. M., Hodges, N. J., & Ward, P. (2005). The relative
effectiveness of various instructional approaches in developing anticipation
skill. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 11, 98e110.
Wong, T., Masters, R. S. W., Maxwell, J. P., & Abernethy, B. A. (2008). Reinvestment
and falls in community-dwelling older adults. Neurorehabilitation and Neural
Repair, 22, 410e414.
Zhu, F. F., Poolton, J. M., Wilson, M. R., Maxwell, J. P., & Masters, R. S. W. (2011).
Neural co-activation as a yardstick of implicit motor learning and the pro-
pensity for conscious control of movement. Biological Psychology, 87, 66e73.
Zinsser, N., Bunker, L., & Williams, J. M. (2001). Cognitive techniques for building
conﬁdence and enhancing performance. In J. M. Williams (Ed.), Applied sport
psychology: Personal growth to peak performance (4th ed.). (pp. 284e311).
Mountain View, CA: Mayﬁeld.
